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Abstract—Nowadays, using cryptographic systems play an 
effective role in security and safety technologies. One of the 
most applied kind of cryptography is Symmetric Cryptography 
and its applications.  New aspects of symmetric Cryptography 
methodologies and applications has been presented by this 
paper. Security-based networks and some complex technolo-
gies such as RFID and parallel security settings has been intro-
duced by using Symmetric Cryptography is the main base of 
discussion in this paper. Designing an unique protocol for 
Symmetric Cryptography in security networks elements is our 
focus.
Reviewing benefits of using these methodologies has been pre-
sented and discussed in this paper. 
Keywords- Cryptography; Symmetric Cryptography; RFID;
parallel security; Complex designing
I. INTRODUCTION
It is widely recognized that security issues play a crucial 
role in the majority of computer and communication sys-
tems. A central tool for achieving software protection is 
Cryptography. Cryptographic algorithms are most efficient-
ly implemented in custom hardware than in software run-
ning on general purpose processors. Hardware implementa-
tions are of extreme importance in case of high perfor-
mance, security against system intruders and busy systems, 
where a cryptographic task consumes too much time. Tradi-
tional ASIC solutions have the well-known drawback of 
reduced flexibility compared to software solutions. Since 
modern security protocols are increasingly becoming algo-
rithm independent, a high degree of flexibility with respect 
to the cryptographic algorithms is desirable. The security 
degrees of all the techniques are based on the hardness of 
mathematical problems. Among them, Elliptic curve crypto-
graphy shows a promise to be an alternative of RSA. A 
promising solution which combines high flexibility with the 
speed and physical security of traditional hardware is the 
implementation of cryptographic algorithms on reconfigura-
ble devices such as FPGAs. FPGAs are hardware devices 
whose function is not fixed and which can be programmed 
in-system [1].
It is essential for providing some requirements in Hardware 
and Software systems security. By using Symmetric Cryp-
tography and its aspects, we can design some complex secu-
rity systems with encryption algorithms. 
When we use a complex system like RFID tags, its security 
must be covered all of its elements. 
II. SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY
Symmetric key systems require both the sender and the re-
cipient to have the same key. This key is used by the sender 
to encrypt the data, and again by the recipient to decrypt the 
data. Key exchange is clearly a problem. How do you se-
curely send a key that will enable you to send other data 
securely? If a private key is intercepted or stolen, the adver-
sary can act as either party and view all data and communi-
cations. You can think of the symmetric crypto system as 
akin to the Chubb type of door locks. You must be in pos-
session of a key to both open and lock the door.
Symmetric cryptography uses a single private key to both 
encrypt and decrypt data. Any party that has the key can use 
it to encrypt and decrypt data. They are also referred to as 
block ciphers. 
Symmetric cryptography algorithms are typically fast and 
are suitable for processing large streams of data. 
The disadvantage of symmetric cryptography is that it pre-
sumes two parties have agreed on a key and been able to 
exchange that key in a secure manner prior to communica-
tion. This is a significant challenge. Symmetric algorithms 
are usually mixed with public key algorithms to obtain a 
blend of security and speed.
III. SYMMETRIC CRYPTOGRAPHY AND ENCRYPTION 
MODULES ALGORITHMS IN RFID-BASED SYSTEMS
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is an emerging tech-
nology. The main idea behind it is to attach a so called 
RFID tag to every object in a particular environment and 
give a digital identity to all these objects. An RFID tag is a 
small microchip, with an antenna, holding a unique ID and 
other information which can be sent over radio frequency.  
The information can be automatically read and registered by 
RFID readers. The data received by the RFID reader can be 
subsequently processed by a back-end database. Figure 1
gives a graphical overview of an RFID system.
Figure 1: Overview of an RFID system
The range of possible applications varies with the capability 
of the tag and is separated by different classes. Class 0 and 
Class 1 RFID tags are used as barcode replacement and are 
read-only or can be programmed only once in the field, re-
spectively. Inventory maintenance which is used in the 
supply chain management can be automated using such tags. 
They are cheap (approximately 5 Cents) and can be used on 
item-level on nearly every product. This paper is focusing 
on more advanced tags (Class 2) which also have a rewrita-
ble memory and additional hardware resources but do not 
have an active power supply on the tag. The energy for op-
eration is pulled from the electromagnetic field provided by 
the reader. In addition, the reader also provides the digital 
clock frequency for operation. Certain modulation methods 
are used for communication from the reader to the tag and
vice versa. Such tags cost about 50 Cents and the available 
silicon area is about 10,000 gates. 
value products like pharmaceutical and branded goods can 
be protected against security vulnerabilities. In this paper, 
we demonstrate how the project ART (Authentication for 
long-range RFID systems) proposes to improve current 
RFID systems by providing secure authentication. The 
project is performed by four independent partners, two from 
industry and two academic partners. A major goal of the 
project is to enhance the functionality of current RFID tags 
with passive power supply. The basic functionality of RFID 
systems is to provide identification of individual objects by 
the replies the attached RFID tag sends to a request per-
formed by a reader. The reader uses an attached database to 
link the received ID number to a specific object described in 
the database. The major drawback of those systems is that 
the communication scheme does not provide a method to 
prove the claimed identity. Since a typical tag answers its ID 
to any reader (without a possibility to check whether a read-
er is authorized to receive the information), and the replied 
ID is always the same, an attacker can easily forge the sys-
tem by reading out the data of a tag and duplicating it to 
bogus tags. Closed RFID systems with common access of 
all readers to a central database, can check for illegal dupli-
cates (bogus tags) within the database but this is not practic-
al for many applications. Furthermore, it is impossible to 
distinguish the original tag from its illegal duplicates.  
Strong authentication mechanisms can solve uprising securi-
ty problems in RFID systems and therefore give protected 
tags an added value. The three main security threats in RFID 
systems are forgery of tags, unwanted tracking of customers, 
and the unauthorized access to the tag’s memory. In this 
paper, we propose authentication protocols for RFID sys-
tems based on the ISO/IEC 9798-2 standard [2]. These pro-
tocols allow protecting high-value goods against adversary 
attackers. Additionally, we show that these protocols are 
feasible for nowadays restriction concerning data rates and 
compliance to existing standards as well as the requirements 
concerning chip area and power consumption. With authen-
tication we mean a method to provide a proof for a claimed 
identity. This proof is based on a secret stored within the 
authenticating part of the system. As long as the secret in-
formation stays secret and the used protocol does not leak 
sensitive information, an attacker cannot forge a tag. A 
communication system providing authentication can reject 
access (to information, entry, etc.) to non authorized parties.  
To keep the authentication secure, it is necessary that an 
attacker does not gain information about the secret by listen-
ing passively to successful authentications. To fulfill this 
requirement for strong authentication, it is necessary to use 
cryptographically strong computations.
A)Symmetric Authentication 
Authentication is the mechanism that one entity proves its 
identity to another entity. Strong authentication protocols, 
such as challenge-response protocols (standardized in 
ISO/IEC 9798) are widely used in practice today. In chal-
lenge-response protocols, one or several messages are ex-
changed between the party who wants to prove its identity 
(the claimant) and the party who wants to verify the identity 
(the verifier). This is called the protocol. In a typical scena-
rio, the verifier challenges the claimant with an unpredicta-
ble value that is used no more than once (the nonce). The 
claimant is required to return a response that is depending 
on the nonce and on the stored secret. Using strong authen-
tication for RFID systems leads to significant security en-
hancements. If readers are required to authenticate them-
selves to tags, attacks such as unwanted tracking and unau-
thorized memory access are rendered infeasible. If tags are 
required to authenticate themselves against readers forgery 
of tags is prevented. It is advantageous to use standardized 
protocols and algorithms because they have been rigorously 
cryptanalyzed and are widely used. systems based on stan-
dardized protocols and algorithms are more likely to be se-
cure and interoperable with other well established infra-
structures. Standardized challenge-response protocols are 
defined upon symmetric-key and asymmetric-key crypto-
graphic primitives. Using symmetric-key cryptography has 
the disadvantage that there is one secret key shared through 
all parties. If one key is compromised for any reason the 
whole systems gets insecure. However, strong asymmetric-
key cryptography requires extremely costly arithmetic oper-
ations and is therefore out of question for RFID systems 
today. Strong symmetric-key cryptographic primitives in-
clude encryption primitives such as AES [3] which allow 
compact implementations [1]. In the following, a few au-
thentication protocols based on challenge-response methods 
are explained.
1. Protocol Extension. The most important command is 
the anti-collision sequence which is a command every tag 
has to implement. Thereby, the reader sends an initial in-
ventory command. All tags in the environment make a re-
sponse which is the tag’s unique ID. If only one tag an-
swers to the request the ID can be retrieved by the reader 
and all subsequent commands can be addressed using the 
ID which addresses one single tag. If two or more tags 
make an answer to a request a collision occurs. This can 
be detected at the reader. The reader then uses a modified 
inventory request where it adds a part of the tag’s ID to the 
request. Only tags which have this part of the ID are al-
lowed to answer. Once the ID of one tag is identified, the 
reader sends a “stay quiet” command to the tag with the 
identified ID. This method is used as long as there are no 
more collisions and all tags within the environment are 
identified. Adding an authentication command to the ISO 
18000 standard works by using a custom command which 
can be defined. The challenge-response protocol fits ideal-
ly to the overall request-response protocol. When authen-
ticating a tag, the reader sends a challenge within the re-
quest and the tag answers according to the presented au-
thentication protocol.
2. Interleaved Authentication Protocol. The authentication 
protocol mentioned above only works when the result of the 
cryptographic primitive is available within the time defined 
for the tag’s response. As this time is very short a modifica-
tion of this authentication scheme was proposed where the 
calculation time for the algorithm is of minor importance. 
For this purpose, authentication is split into two parts. The 
first part is the Authentication Request (AR), which tells the 
tag to encrypt the challenge and does not expect any re-
sponse. The second part is the Response Request (RR), 
which collects the authentication response, when the result 
is available. For one tag, the timing overhead is large, but 
with more than one tag, the reader can use the idle time 
(during the tag is busy calculating) to send authentication 
requests (or other requests) to other tags [4] .
3.Cryptographic Hardware Module. Computation of the 
cryptographic algorithm AES (Advanced Encryption Stan-
dard) is computationally very complex compared to other 
tasks of tags. The implementation of the AES that fulfils the 
requirements concerning low power consumption and low 
die size is far away from being trivial. The current consump-
tion of additional hardware components on an RFID tag 
must not exceed 10µA to avoid reduction of the operating 
range [5] .
By using these algorithms, we can design a complex encryp-
tion systems that can be influenced on software and hard-
ware modules in RFID-based systems. Our main strategy in 
defining a security base for complex systems is with follow-
ing steps:
 Software-based Security(SbS)
 Hardware-based Security(HbS)
 Complexity-based Security(CbS) 
This methodology is our main focus on “Parallel Cryptogra-
phy” which has been designed in three separate steps and 
finally added to an unique cycle that its planning is in Sym-
metric Cryptographic algorithms as showed in figure 2.
Figure 2 : Complex Symmetric Cryptography diagram
IV. BENEFITS OF PARALLEL CRYPTOGRAPHY USING
When a complex system uses Parallel Security System 
(PSS), probability of mistakes in description has been de-
creased, because of designing a complex system with three 
main security base that can support security of software, 
hardware and a combination security by Symmetric Crypto-
graphy and parallel security. Figure 3 shows that how a Pa-
rallel Security System can cover all of cryptographic securi-
ty base in a complex design.
SbS HbS
CbS
Figure 3. Parallel Security System in a complex design
V. CONCLUSION  
At this paper, we show that the most application  Symme-
tric-based security systems in complex designing is Parallel 
Security System (PSS). When we use a Parallel Security 
System, we can support all of software and hardware layers 
in a complex design and by using this algorithm coverage of 
all subsystems can be provided. Our main strategy discus-
sion in a sample complex system such as RFID tags can 
make a secure and safe space for using these kinds of sys-
tems. Three steps PSS in complex designing can make a 
cover layer between processing all of procedures .
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